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Introduction
 Fiscal imbalances, a shrinking economy, 
and severe problems with its banking system 
plunged Slovenia into the largest financial cri-
sis in its history. The problems in the country’s 
banking system are closely related to Slovenia’s 
past: banks issued billions of euros in loans 
with relaxed lending standards during times 
of financial prosperity and economic stability. 
These loans were granted because there were 
no immediate signs of the ensuing economic 
strife such deals would later spark. The most 
severe problems plague state-owned banks, 
which hold the largest market share in Slo-
venia’s banking system, and continue to pre-
vent Slovenia’s economy from stabilizing. In 
stimulating the economy and breaking free of 
a double-dip recession, Slovenian banks must 
continue to revitalize lending while strictly 
adhering to proper due diligence practices, a 
process that requires both banking sector and 
corporate sector restructuring.
 Prior to the dawn of the world financial 
crisis, the Slovenian economy was among the 
fastest growing economies in the euro area. 
Problems began soon after 2008 as the wave of 
the U.S.’s financial crisis began to have an im-
pact on Europe. While all European countries 
were affected, the crisis affected Slovenia more 
significantly as billions of euros in defaulted 
loans plagued the Slovenian banking sector. 
Slovenia experienced a double-dip recession 
with real GDP falling over 9.5 percent from 
the onset of the country’s financial instability 
in mid-2008 to late 2013. As seen in Figure 1, 
stagnant and negative economic trends have 
restrained GDP growth over the 2006–2013 
time period, essentially making the past sev-
en years “lost” in terms of economic strength 
(Statistical Office…). With negative trends in 
employment and domestic consumption, ris-
ing government debt, and rising inflation, Slo-
venia’s GDP further contracted by 1.1 percent 
in 2013.
 As evidenced by a severe decline in GDP 
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over the 2008–2009 period, shown in Figure 
1, Slovenia was not prepared to weather the 
world’s growing economic crisis. Banking sec-
tor structural weaknesses pushed the nation to 
its financial tipping point and brought it close 
to needing international funds to repair the 
economy. In an attempt to avert such bailout 
funds, Slovenia continues to introduce stabili-
ty and reform programs driven by the govern-
ment’s own resources: capital reserves, issu-
ance of sovereign securities, state-owned bank 
and firm privatizations, and tightened banking 
sector regulation. To ensure financial stability, 
Slovenia must recapitalize and restructure its 
burdened banking sector. 
Slovenian Banking Environment
 This article focuses on Slovenia’s three 
largest banks in which the Slovenian govern-
ment owned significant participating interest 
at the outset of the country’s financial crisis: 
Nova Ljubljanska Banka (NLB), Nova Kredit-
na Banka Maribor (NKBM), and Abanka Vipa 
(Abanka). NLB, NKBM, and Abanka are the 
most important Slovenian banks to analyze for 
three reasons. First, these three banks owned 
a combined total asset market share in Slo-
venia of 38.5 percent in 2013 and thus have a 
substantial impact on Slovenia’s economy, an 
impact that was more pronounced with signifi-
cantly higher market shares at the outset of the 
financial crisis. Second, state-owned banks in 
Slovenia were more adversely affected by the 
world financial crisis than foreign-owned pri-
vate banks, because the latter banks followed 
strict governance standards from their foreign 
mother banks and were more prudent in ex-
tending loans (e.g., following proper loan due 
diligence). Third, foreign-owned banks have 
proved less problematic to the Slovenian gov-
ernment than state-owned banks because for-
eign mother banks are primarily responsible 
for their banks’ recapitalization and rehabilita-
tion (NLB; Nova KBM; Abanka).
 Overview of Slovenian Banking   
 Sector
 The highly leveraged economic growth 
in Slovenia was an unsustainable situation. 
Plagued by the world financial crisis beginning 
in late 2008, credit growth1 from the Slovenian 
banking sector to the private sector stagnat-
ed (see “Loans to non-banking sector (net)” 
in Figure 2) and experienced negative growth 
over the 2010–2013 period. The world financial 
Figure 1 
Slovenia’s Real GDP (€Billion) and GDP Growth: 2000–2013
Note: Data before 2007 are recalculated using the fixed exchange rate between tolar and euro (239.64 tolars 
for 1 euro).
Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia.
 1Credit growth refers to an increase in loans to the 
non-banking sector.
Real GDP Growth, %Real GDP (constant prices, reference year 2000)
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 2Banks service loans by collecting payments from 
a borrower that consist of original principal and interest 
payment on the outstanding loan amount. Borrowers, in 
this case enterprises, service loans by making payments.
 3The interbank market is a market in which banks 
lend to one another.
 4Maturity mismatch refers to a firm’s short-term 
liabilities outweighing its short-term assets. A bank’s lia-
bilities are deposits, and its assets are loaned funds.
crisis ended a period of high-growth bank 
lending in Slovenia that had relied heavily on 
borrowed funds from foreign financial institu-
tions. Facing uncertain international financial 
market performance, downgraded sovereign 
debt, and a weakened banking sector, Slove-
nian bank funding has steadily deteriorated 
since the onset of the world financial crisis 
(BOS, “Report on Comprehensive…”).
 Slovenian banks have operated at a loss 
over the 2010–2013 period, which has severe-
ly diminished banks’ capital adequacies. Banks 
under majority state ownership, including 
NLB, NKBM, and Abanka, have been particu-
larly affected. The adverse affect of operating 
losses on capital adequacy has led to reduced 
capital requirements and stagnated lending 
activities. Despite lowered capital require-
ments, Slovenian banks’ capital adequacy 
ratios remain below those of comparable 
banks within the euro area (BOS, “Report on 
Comprehensive…”).
 Banking Sector Decline
 Banks make money by granting loans 
and collecting fees and interest as a result of 
these loan transactions. If borrowers do not 
service their loans,2 as in the case of Slovenia, 
then banks are not profitable. Additionally, the 
sources of banks’ loanable funds are deposits 
and the interbank market.3 Profitable banks 
gain from the margin between the interest 
rates at which they are borrowing from de-
positors and the interbank market and rates 
at which they are lending to borrowers. Slove-
nian banks faced high risk due to maturity mis-
match4 because interbank credit is historically 
short term whereas loans that Slovenian banks 
issued to the private sector over the past two 
decades were typically long term. 
 After 2008, as the world plunged further 
into a deep financial crisis, the interbank credit 
market dried up. Slovenian banks, which were 
borrowing in the interbank market, found 
Figure 2 
Total Combined Loans and Deposits (€Billion) of NLB, NKBM, and Abanka 
Sources: Abanka; NLB; Nova KBM.
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that when loans came due they were not being 
renewed. Since no new money was coming in, 
banks increased the terms of their lending to 
enterprises, thereby increasing interest costs 
to lend and shortening the maturity struc-
tures of these loans. Thus, enterprises that 
borrowed money from Slovenian banks found 
that as loans came due for payment, banks did 
not want to renew them. Enterprises interested 
in investing do not have many long-term loan 
options, and the loans that are available have 
become prohibitively expensive. Thus, certain 
investments are not viable for enterprises given 
the current banking sector situation in Slove-
nia. With insufficient available capital to invest 
in continued operations and development, Slo-
venian enterprise growth has stagnated and in-
hibited economic growth. 
 To add to the hardship the Slovenian 
banking sector faced, banks did not follow 
appropriate due diligence practices. In oth-
er words, there was no proper credit approval 
process. When banking activity slowed down, 
enterprises found it more difficult to service 
loans and ran into arrears5 with Slovenian 
banks. Thus, the Slovenian banking system 
found that many of the loans became toxic 
(i.e., non-performing). When loans become 
non-performing, banks must include loan loss 
provisions and tighten credit standards. Slove-
nian banks first tightened credit because the 
supply was down and then further tightened 
credit because the loans that they did grant 
were not being serviced by the enterprise sec-
tor. At the outset of 2014, Slovenia was in a 
“credit crunch”—banks have not been lend-
ing to enterprises and economic growth has 
suffered as a result (Banerjee).
 The Problem of Non-Performing 
 Loans
 According to the European Banking 
Authority, non-performing loans (NPLs) are 
categorized as loans that have been granted 
to borrowers rated D and E as well as loans 
that have been in default for more than 90 
days (BOS, “Report on Comprehensive…”). 
The metric given by a bank’s NPL value divid-
ed by total loan value, shown in Figure 3, is a 
financial soundness indicator used as a proxy 
for asset quality. There are four ways that dis-
tressed countries handle NPLs: 1) sell them on 
the open market, 2) restructure them, 3) hold 
them, or 4) establish a “bad bank” that will ab-
sorb these “bad” assets to clean the country’s 
banks’ balance sheets (Ernst & Young). With 
26.1 percent of all three banks’ total loan val-
ue deemed non-performing in 2013 (note the 
mostly upward trend of NPLs for NLB, NKBM, 
and Abanka in Table 1), there remains signifi-
cant work to be done.
 An NPL Example: Nova  
 Ljubjanska Banka6
 NLB, Slovenia’s largest bank, which was 
more than 90 percent directly or indirectly 
owned by the government pre-privatization, 
is in the process of correcting a troubling 
 5The term arrears refers to the amount of overdue 
payments a borrower has accrued from missed loan pay-
ments.  
 6This section is intended to briefly illustrate the is-
sue of NPLs within Slovenian banks and in doing so simpli-
fies NLB’s financial structure.
% Values 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
NLB 1.7 2.5 4.5 10.5 17.9 26.0 20.4
NKBM 3.5 2.2 5.9 9.2 12.1 16.9 25.5
Abanka 2.0 2.4 3.7 10.9 16.5 25.7 46.1
Sources: Abanka; NLB; Nova KBM.
Table 1
Ratios of Non-Performing Loans to Total Loans of NLB, NKBM, and Abanka
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situation: the combined value of debt (borrow-
ings and deposits) and equity (from the bank’s 
shareholders) grossly exceeds the amount of 
non-toxic assets on its balance sheet (“Market 
Shares of Biggest…”). From NLB’s simpli-
fied 2012 balance sheet (Table 2), it is evident 
that customer loans (loans to banks and the 
non-banking sector that are assets on a bank’s 
balance sheet) are the majority of NLB’s total 
assets. Although a high percentage of customer 
loans as a percentage of a bank’s total assets is 
normal across banks worldwide, NLB possesses 
an extremely high NPL/total loan ratio of 26.0 
percent. The high percentage of NPLs in Slo-
venia, fueled by lenient lending practices and 
sub-par capital adequacy requirements, has 
devastated the Slovenian economy. 
 As a concrete example, a simplified ver-
sion of NLB’s 2012 balance sheet7 illustrates 
Slovenia’s problem. NLB’s €8,197.7 million in 
loans to banks and the non-banking sector (cus-
tomer loans) account for 71.4 percent of NLB’s 
2012 total assets of €11,487.0 million. The re-
maining 28.6 percent of total assets include 
cash, financial assets such as securities and 
derivatives, property and equipment, intangi-
ble assets, and other investments. On the oth-
er side of NLB’s balance sheet, total liabilities 
(or debt) of €10,420.0 million account for 90.7 
percent of total debt plus equity while equity 
accounts for the remaining 9.3 percent. The 
problem lies in the NPLs, the bad assets. At the 
end of 2012, NLB had an NLP/total loan ratio 
of 26.0 percent. This ratio translates to a total 
NPL value of €2,131.4 million or 18.55 percent
of NLB’s total assets (NLB). NPLs have shrunk 
the realistically realizable value of NLB’s loans, 
thereby forming a significant gap between the 
bank’s assets and debt and signaling the need 
for government action.
Rehabilitation Initiatives for  
Slovenia’s Banking System
 Three major catalysts have fueled Slove-
nia’s current banking sector predicament: ex-
cessive lending without proper due diligence 
practices, the global economic crisis, and a lack 
of adherence to capital adequacy requirements 
as required by the Bank of Slovenia (BOS) and 
EU banking regulations.
 While doomsday speculations have calmed, 
there remains significant work to be done: 
 1) Hastened privatization of state-owned 
 banks and other institutions that would 
 improve operational efficiency through 
 privatization
 2) Strengthening of banking supervision 
 at the bank management and EU levels
 3) The transfer of burdening NPLs on the 
 balance sheets of Slovenian banks to 
 the government-run Bank Asset Manage- 
 ment Company (BAMC)
 4)Strict compliance with BOS and EU 
 banking regulations
 5) Regular independent asset quality 
 reviews (AQRs)
% Values 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
NLB 1.7 2.5 4.5 10.5 17.9 26.0 20.4
NKBM 3.5 2.2 5.9 9.2 12.1 16.9 25.5
Abanka 2.0 2.4 3.7 10.9 16.5 25.7 46.1
Table 2
NLB’s 2012 Balance Sheet
Source: NLB.
Figure 3
NLB’s 2012 Balance Sheet
Source: NLB.
€Million (Except %)
Total assets 11,487.0
Customer loans   8,197.7
Total liabilities 10,420.0
Total equity   1,067.0
NPL/total loan ratio              26.0%
 7In its most simple form, a balance sheet unveils a 
firm’s financial position by detailing the values of a firm’s 
assets, liabilities, and equity capital at a given time.
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Slovenia’s banks and government have made 
steady strides in alleviating the current stresses 
of the deteriorating economy and failing bank-
ing system. The following sections detail these 
efforts.
 Privatization
 The government of the Republic of Slove-
nia is currently moving to divest its non-stra-
tegic stakes and holdings in banks and other 
companies. The government has adopted the 
“Privatization Programme,” under which it 
will privatize 15 firms (Petra). With specific 
regard to the country’s banking sector, the Slo-
venian government is taking steps to reduce its 
participating interest in NLB to no more than 
25 percent and sell off its entire participating 
interest in NKBM (BOS, “Bank of Slovenia…”). 
Selling state-owned companies to the private 
sector will generate capital to help pay down 
government debt. Additionally, a reduction 
of the government’s participating interest in 
NLB, NKBM, and Abanka will likely improve 
management of the country’s banking sector.
 BAMC Formation and  
 Recapitalization
 Measures taken to strengthen Slovenian 
banks include 1) a comprehensive review of 
the banking system; 2) an immediate capital 
increase at NLB, NKBM, and Abanka (Table 3); 
3) required burden-sharing on behalf of bank 
shareholders; 4) the transfer of NPLs to the 
BAMC; 5) capital increases for Slovenian banks; 
6) a guarantee by the Slovenian government to 
provide requisite capital as a lender of last re-
sort; and 7) future BOS responsibilities, includ-
ing the implementation of regular bank stress 
tests.
 In the first phase of bank restructuring, 
Slovenian banks needed to determine how in-
sufficient their reserves and equity (e.g., loan 
loss provisions) were in covering the face value 
of these NPLs. As expected, Slovenian banks 
faced an overwhelming lack of sufficient funds, 
and the government prepared to recapitalize 
these troubled banks. 
 Transferring “assets” of bad loans to a bad 
bank at a steep discount from the original val-
ue of these loans will clean the balance sheets 
of Slovenian banks that are burdened with 
NPLs. Created in October 2012, the BAMC is 
a much delayed government program enacted 
to relieve Slovenian banks of €4.778 billion in 
bad loans. The BAMC will focus on dealing with 
the bad loans it absorbs, thereby freeing the 
relieved banks to focus on regular operations 
(OECD). The amount of bad assets transferred 
to the BAMC will be replaced with government 
equity on banks’ balance sheets.
 The BOS and the Ministry of Finance, 
along with observers from the European Com-
mission,  European Central Bank (ECB), and 
European Banking Authority, conducted a 
comprehensive review of Slovenia’s banking 
sector over a five-month period, August 2013 to 
December 2013. The comprehensive review an-
alyzed the quality of assets on Slovenian banks’ 
balance sheets and subjected the banks to stress 
tests that analyzed the robustness of the Slove-
nian banking sector under adverse economic 
scenarios over a time horizon of three years, 
2013 to 2015. Regulators determined that the 
capital deficit of the Slovenian-banking sector 
totaled €4.778 billion and the immediate capi-
tal needed to stabilize Slovenia’s three largest, 
state-owned banks totaled €3.012 billion (Table 
4) (BOS, “Bank of Slovenia…”).
 The stress tests of the Slovenian-banking 
sector conducted in late 2013 proved Slove-
nia’s ability to recover without external bail-
out funds. Under mounting pressure from the 
ECB,8 Slovenia has been working to swiftly re-
capitalize distressed yet viable Slovenian banks 
and swiftly liquidate insolvent ones. Even pri-
or to Slovenia’s comprehensive banking sec-
tor review, NLB, NKBM, and Abanka failed to 
meet the BOS’s capital requirements. Capital 
requirements are important because a strong 
capital base allows banks to comfortably offset 
losses without needing to seek assistance from 
the Slovenian government or foreign financial 
institutions. The capital serves as a financial 
buffer in times of economic turmoil. It allows 
the bank to avail itself of credit facilities to its 
clients even when financial supplies are low. 
In general, higher capital bases translate to 
stronger balance sheets.
 8The ECB is the central bank for Europe’s main 
currency: the euro. The ECB aims to maintain the euro’s 
purchasing power and ensure European financial stability.
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 The stress test results concluded that 
these three banks need an immediate combined 
capital injection of €3.012 billion financed 
from government cash and attractive, high-
yield bond issuances in the form of sovereign 
securities (see Table 3 for specific figures). 
Shortly thereafter, NLB and NKBM submit-
ted reorganization plans to the European 
Commission and received capital increases in 
mid-December 2013 after being deemed com-
pliant with state aid rules. In mid-February 
2014, Abanka sent its reorganization plan to 
the Ministry of Finance in Slovenia, which sub-
sequently followed the same path through the 
European Commission as the other two banks’ 
reorganization plans (“Abanka Restructuring 
Plan…”). Beyond receiving capital increases, 
NLB, NKBM, and Abanka will transfer a major-
ity of their NPLs to the BAMC. In an effort to 
combat the high Slovenian government debt 
(government debt is expected to stand at 75.6 
percent of GDP after executing banking sector 
restructuring plans) and ensure future bank-
ing sector health, the government plans to pri-
vatize many government interests, including 
total participating interest in NKBM and Aban-
ka as well as most of its participating interest in 
NLB (BOS, “Bank of Slovenia…”). In addition 
to funding capital increases and the transfer of 
NPLs to the BAMC, the Slovenian government 
Total 
Capital 
Increase, 
€Million
Capital  
Increase 
via Cash
Capital 
Increase via 
Sovereign 
Securities
Write-down of 
Subordinated 
Instruments 
(Bail-in)
Transfer of 
Non-Perform- 
ing Claims to 
BAMC
Tier 1 Capital 
Ratio after 
Transaction
NLB 1,551 1,140 411 257        711 15.0%
NKBM      870    619 251   64        422 16.8%
Abanka    591    348   243* 120        543*  9.0%†
Total 3,012 2,107 905 441     1,676 −
*Estimate.
†Tier 1 capital ratio after approval of provisional ruling for state aid (capital increase via cash in the amount of €348 million). The 
tier 1 capital ratio, the ratio of a bank’s core equity capital to its risk-weighted assets, is a measure of a bank’s capital adequacy.
Source: BOS, “Bank of Slovenia... .”
Table 3
Sources of Capital Increases for NLB, NKBM, and Abanka
Table 4
Capital Deficits and Required Capital Injections for Slovenian Banks
Source: BOS, “Bank of Slovenia... .”
Bank
Capital Deficit under  
the Adverse Scenario, 
€Million
Total Capital  
Increase,  
€Million
NLB 1,904 1,551
NKBM 1,055    870
Abanka    756    591
Slovenia’s next five highest capital-deficient banks 
  (Banka Celje, Gorenjska Banka, Hypo Alpe-Adria- 
   Bank, Raiffeisen Banka, UniCredit Banka Slovenija)
1,064
Capital strengthening 
via money from private 
investors
Total 4,778 3,012
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guarantees additional capital as a lender of last 
resort to banks facing troubling circumstances 
(BOS, “Report on Comprehensive…”).
  
 Strengthening Banking Sector  
 Regulation
 In understanding the Slovenian banking 
sector’s past and present performance, regula-
tion analysis is a paramount area to consider. 
In the wake of the global financial crisis, the 
ECB introduced a new European banking su-
pervision department, tentatively named the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), to im-
prove transparency and management of Euro-
pean banks in an effort to encourage investor 
confidence and ensure banking stability within 
the EU. Under the SSM, all banking sector su-
pervision will be harmonized under the same 
set of standard methodologies imposed by the 
ECB on all member states of the EU. The ECB 
will assume full EU banking supervision in 
November 2014 (BOS, “Report on Comprehen-
sive…”).
 Beyond the roles of EU banking super-
visory bodies, major responsibility for the ap-
propriate management and supervision of the 
Slovenian banking sector regulation falls on 
banks’ management boards, whereas regula-
tions imposed on Slovenian banks on behalf 
of the BOS represent the minimum stan-
dards for banking operations (BOS, “Strategic 
Plan…”). Beyond the BOS regulations, Euro-
pean banks are guided by Basel III9 regulations, 
which are all-inclusive sets of restructuring 
measures in banking practice regulation for-
mulated by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (Bank for International Settle-
ments). The objectives of these regulations 
are to strengthen the bank’s transparency 
and disclosures, supervise, and improve risk 
management and governance of the banking 
sector. The Basel III regulations were formu-
lated as a result of numerous weaknesses ex-
posed by the recent financial crises in the 
global regulatory framework (Accenture). The 
regulations cover the following aspects: capi-
tal requirements, risk coverage, leverage, risk 
management, and supervision.
 The Slovenian banking sector is subject 
to all Basel III’s core principles. In order to 
gauge Slovenia’s compliance, the Internation-
al Monetary Fund conducted an assessment 
of Slovenia’s banking sector’s compliance 
with Basel III regulation in December 2012. 
The assessment concluded that the Slovenian 
banking sector is largely compliant with Basel 
III regulation (International Monetary Fund). 
In order to comply with the regulation, the 
BOS has transposed EU banking directives 
by harmonizing them with banking regula-
tion in Slovenia. Although largely compliant, 
NLB, NKBM, and Abanka all failed to meet the 
BOS’s capital requirements before stress tests 
were conducted. However, after the realization 
of capital increases and other restructuring 
measures across the Slovenian banking sector, 
banks’ capital adequacy will increase, thereby 
revitalizing lending practices to creditworthy 
enterprises and allowing banks to address the 
remaining portion of NPLs that have not yet 
been transferred to the BAMC (BOS, “Bank of 
Slovenia…”).
 Independent Asset Quality Reviews
 AQRs are complete reviews of individual 
loans and their corresponding rating classifica-
tions that identify loan impairments and allo-
cate loan loss provisioning. The BOS contract-
ed with experienced international consultants 
to conduct the 2013 AQRs and stress tests to 
ensure completeness and independence. As for 
the parties involved in the stress tests, the firms 
selected were Oliver Wyman (performing a bot-
tom-up stress test analysis) and Roland Berger 
Strategy Consultants (performing a top-down 
stress test analysis). The firms selected to con-
duct the 2013 AQR were Deloitte and Ernst & 
Young (BOS, “Report on Comprehensive…”).
 Asset quality remains weak despite recap-
italization and restructuring initiatives due to 
the large number of under-performing loans 
still on banks’ balance sheets after the initial 
transfer of assets to the BAMC, high corporate 
leverage, and further credit deterioration (“Slo-
venian Banks’ Bad…”). With the immense ac-
cumulation of deteriorating assets (e.g., NPLs) 
at the outset of Slovenia’s financial crisis, it is 
vital that the government continue programs 
 9Basel III comprises a set of regulation standards 
that serve to strengthen global capital and liquidity rules 
aimed at creating a more resilient banking sector.
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to conduct future independent AQRs to ensure 
long-term banking system health and strength. 
Measures to conduct AQRs are closely inter-
twined with the need to enforce stricter lend-
ing practices. 
The Next Step: Enterprise  
Restructuring
 The majority of NPLs on banks’ balance 
sheets were lent to the corporate sector. Most 
Slovenian businesses have a highly levered10 
capital structure that inhibits Slovenian banks 
from revitalizing lending practices. In order 
to ensure a sound recovery, Slovenia must en-
courage corporate deleveraging and restruc-
turing.
 If firms are not restructured in the sense 
that their credit exposure is diminished, then 
banks will not be able to extend credit to the 
enterprise sector. Therefore, the BOS and the 
Slovenian government are developing an en-
terprise-restructuring strategy to normalize 
Slovenian firms’ balance sheets and encour-
age firms to revamp borrowing practices. Be-
fore banks reinitiate lending practices, they 
have to be fully restructured; but in order to 
start lending, Slovenian banks must follow 
proper due diligence practices. If firms do 
not restructure, then the bleak outlook of the 
highly indebted enterprise sector will cause 
banks to be reluctant to lend. For banks, it 
is difficult to acquire new creditworthy cli-
ents because the firms that need credit gen-
erally carry more risk while the less risky 
creditworthy firms need less credit. In short, 
the enterprise sector must be restructured to 
encourage lending and stimulate the country’s 
economic growth. In addition to enterprise 
financial restructuring, Slovenian enterpris-
es must practice responsible ownership and 
ensure the implementation of sound business 
models in an effort to prevent future financial 
turmoil (BOS, “Stability of the Slovenian…”). 
Conclusion
 With strong investor sentiment, strong 
consumer sentiment, and low interest rates, 
the situation in Slovenia was right for growth 
on borrowed money. In addition, the world 
financial crisis in late 2008 brought about 
a new era of uncertainty that revealed fiscal 
imbalances and severe shortcomings in the 
nation’s banking system. Combined with a 
lack of due diligence and the dried-up pool of 
interbank market funds, the Slovenian banking 
system fueled the rapid decline of the country’s 
economy. Despite severe problems plaguing 
the country’s banking sector, it is evident that 
Slovenia will weather its devastating financial 
crisis without outside assistance, although 
growth will remain weak for the foreseeable 
future. 
 In conclusion, it is clear that the stabil-
ity of the Slovenian banking system is a man-
ageable situation. To ensure a sound economic 
recovery, Slovenia must continue the process 
of recapitalizing viable banks, transferring out-
standing NPLs to the government-organized 
BAMC, ensuring strict compliance with BOS 
and EU banking regulations, and conducting 
regular AQRs to prevent further banking in-
stability. Beyond these measures to restore 
Slovenia’s banking sector, the government 
must work to continue privatizing struggling 
government-held firms, consolidating fiscal 
spending, and achieving corporate deleverag-
ing and restructuring. With these initiatives 
underway, Slovenia will fully recover in the 
coming years and ensure stable, long-term 
economic prosperity.
 10Leverage is a measure of a firm’s capital structure. 
A highly levered firm finances the majority of its opera-
tions with debt rather than equity, which can generate 
higher returns but also increases risk and magnifies losses. 
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